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This thesis, dealing with the above 
mentioned elements, tests and proofs of a· 
general partnership, the author will en­
deavor to show the relation of these com­
ponent elements in the formation of such 
partnerships . 
1: Partnership inter see 
a. Elements. 
In regard to the requisites of a partnership, the 
rule has often been quoted as being that such requisites 
are that the parties must have joined together to carry 
on a trade or adventure for their COY([rUon benefit, eclch 
contriiJuting property or services and having a communi­
ty of interest in the profits. (145 U. S. 611). In 
California, the Civil Code at Section 2395 states that 
lIa partner:::h i p is the association of two or more 
persons, for the purpose of carrying on business 
together, and dividing its profits between themn. 
How far the sharing in profits of an organization will 
make one a partner has been a subject of much discussion , 
and.. the modern doctrine seems to be that the simple 
sharing of profits is not sufficient to make one a 
partner . For instance, merely receiving compensation 
for services or labor, estbnated cy a certain propor ­
tion of the profits does not render one liable as a 
partner . He must share in those profits as a principal . 
(LoOlnis V. Marshall, 12 Conn. 69 .) Likewi o; e, where 
one has 10a.'rJ.ed money to an enterprise, and who is to 
receive a ce~tain percentae e of the profits in addi­
tion to a stipulated amount of interest, does not 
necessarily make him a partner in that business. So 
it seems that in the requisites as cited above that there 
is one very important element lacking~ As stated by mod­
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ern. authorities, in order to have a true partnership, the 
relation of principal a !:1d agent must exist . The partner 
embraces the character both of principal and a gent. So 
faY- as he acts for himself and his ovrn interest in the 
common concerns of the partnership, he may be deemed a 
principal, and so far as he acts f or his partner, he may 
be deemed an a s ent. The principal distinction between him 
a n d a mere a,,:,;ent is that he has a community of interest wI th 
t h e other partners in the whole property, business and 
responsibilities of the partnership, whereas a simple agent' 
has n o such interest. 
Justice sto~J in a sQmmary in his Commentar ies on 
Partnership concludes that tla participation in the profits 
will ordinarily establish the existence of a partnership 
betwe en the pa rties in favor of third per sons, in the ab ­
sence of all other opposing circumstances ft , but that it 
is not to be regarded as any thing more than mere presump ­
tive proof thereof, and therefore liable to be repelled 
and overcome by other circumstances, and not as of itself 
overcoming or repelling themtl,and that therefore if t he 
participation in the profits can already be shovm to be 
in the character of agent, then the presumption of a 
partnership is repelled. 
And so it has been held that an agent or servant, whose 
compensation is measured by a certain proportion of the 
profits of the partnership bUSiness, is not thereby made a 
p artner. (Perrine V. Haukinson, 11 N. J. L. 215.) And 
likewise an agreement whereby the l essor of a hotel 
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shall receive a certain portion of the profits by way 

of rent, does not make him a partner with the lessee. 

( Beecher & Bush, 45 Mich. 188. ) 

It is now equally as well settled that the receiving 
of paI't of the profits of a comme r cial enterprise in lieu 
of or in addition to interest, by way of compensation for 
a loan of money does not make the lendor a partner . From 
the decisions of all cases cited, theI'e Hill.St be the rela­
tion of principal and agent, w.here e a ch partner i sootLl 
principal ~~d agent. 
2: Partnership the res ~lt of intention. 
a. Le gal intention controls. 
b. Partnership by operation of law. 
Another element which enters into the formation of 
a partnership is the intent of the parties. Persons can­
not be made to assume the relation of partners as between 
themsel ves, vvhen. their purpose is that no partnership shall 
exist. rrhere is no reason why they may not enter into an 
agreement whereby one of t hera shall participate in the 
profits arising in the management of part i cular property 
without his becoming a partner with t h e others. Such 
was held in the case of London As surance Co. vs . Drennan, 
116 U. S. 461 . And so in 20 Cal. Juris at; page 461 it is 
held that an intention to form a partnership is necessary 
as between the parties t hemselves, but not as be tween 
them and third parties. 
As t o those who have had dealings with the alleged 
partners, the question as to the existence of a partner ­
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ship is to be determined with a view to the facts as 
were knovvn to them, unaffected by ary secret agreement 
. between the persons who are sought to be held liable 
as partners. 
The intent of the parties does not necessarily 
depend on their intentions but whether legally there was 
an intent. It is possible for parties to intend no 
partnership and yet form one. If they agree on an arrange­
ment which is a partnership in fact, it is of no import­
a n ce that they call it something else, or that they are 
not partners. The law must de c lare what is the legal 
import of their a greements, and names go for nothing 
when the substance of the arrangement show' them to be 
inapplicable. (Busher vs. Bush, 40 Am. Rep. 465.) 
Mr . Bates, in 17 American and English Encyclopedia 
of Law, 828, gives the following definition of a partner ­
ship: !fA partnership is the contract relation subsisting 
between persons who have combined their labor, property 
and skill in an enterprise or business as principals for 
the purpose of jOint profit. In addition he states till t 
although a partnership is called a contract, it is the 
result of a contract, the relations which subsist between 
persons who have a greed to share the profits of some 
bus iness, rather than the agreement to share such profits . 
Hence, it is not essential to the existence of a partner­
ship that i t be so denominated in the contract of the 
parties, nor is it necessarily fatal thereto if the parties 
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declare in such contract that they do not intend to be 
partners. The real inquiry is, have the parties by their 
contract combined their property, labor 01' skill in an 
enterprise or business , as principals for the purpose of 
joint profit? If they have done so, they are partners in 
that enterprise or business, no ma'lter how earnestly they 
may protest they are not, or how far distant the forma­
tion of a partnership vvas from their mi nds. The terms of 
their contract given, the la'l"1 ste p s in and declares what 
their relations a r e to t h e enterprise or cusines~, a!ld to 
each other. (Spaulding VS. Stubbins, 39 fun. St. Rep. 888). 
In the case of Chapman vs. Hughes: 104 Cal. 302, three 
men created an association for the purpose of c arrying on 
toge ther the busine8s of selling lands, and dividing the 
profits between them. They contemplated united action i n 
advertising and dherwise in promoting sales and a jOint 
expense to be incurred thereby, and further expressly 
provided fOl' the payment to -:~he syndicate o f commissions 
on sales of other lands than those put into the syndicate. 
Tl1is Vias sufficient to constitute the relationsl'lip of 
partnership. ~fuether the parties knew that they were 
partners or not, they certainly intended and contracted 
to do all that in law is necessary to create a partnership. 
The relation of partnership may be estacllsned although 
the parties may not expre s sly intend to crea te such 
relationship. 
In the case of Farnwn vs. Patch, 49 Am. Rep . 313 , 
a number of unincorllorated persons taking nmnDers of 
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"shares" tlfor the purpose of st arting a grocery store tf 
are partners between themselves, although they called 
themselves "stockholders" and their opinion -was that 
there was no liability for losses beyond the amount 
paid for the shares. The reason for the holding was 
that the organization resembled a partnership in every 
manner. The profits were not to be set aside and kept 
as a separa t e fund with a preserved ide~tity, but they 
were to be mingled with and become part of the lIstock­
holders'!! capital . The stockholders were to be joint 
prlilcipals c arrying on the buSiness, and they were to 
share in the profits alike . The result i.s that such 
principals are partner s . 
Thus the intent of the parties seems to be the 
necessary element in a partnership. This intent which 
is deemed essential is an intent to do those things 
which constitute a partnership. Hence, if such an 
intent exists, no~withstanding that they did not pur­
pose the liability attaching to partners, or even ex­
pressly stipulated in their agreement that they were not 
to be partners. It is the substance and not the name 
of the 8Y'rangement between them which determines t heir 
legal relation toward each other. 
3: Tests of 
I 
intention . 
a. Profit sharing. 
b. Intention . 
c. Sharing of losses . 
d . Niutu:.J l Agency . 
e. Comrnon ovmership of property . 
- -- -- -------- --
---- - - -
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The tests of this intent vary considerably, but 
the foremost are the test of profit sharing, sharing 
of losses, intention to form a partnership, mut ual 
agency, and cOlwnunity of interest . 
~he first test, the test of profit sharing which 
was recognized by &'11er1can courts came to us through the 
case of Waugh vs. Carver, an English case . From this 
case, the e a rly kmerican courts established the rule 
that if a person partakes of the profits of any branch 
or trade or bum ness, he is answeraole as a partner' for­
his losses . The reason for this wa s that if he took a 
part of the profits, he took from the creditors a part 
of the fQ~d which was t ll e proper security for the pay­
ment of his deb t s. ,The onl y quallfication which they 
had to the rule was when a pex'son stipulat ed to receive 
a sum of money in proportion to a g iven quantity of the 
profits as a reward for his services, he was not charg e ­
able as a partner . 
Respective states d i f fer on t h e question, many states 
still holding to this doctrine, but other following the 
modified doctr i ne a s laye ci down in Cox vs . HiclrrtlaIl. In 
t:':lis case wa s where two :ne rchants and copartners becoming 
embarrassed in their circumstances, assigned all their 
property to truste e s, empowerine; them to carryon the 
busine ss, and to divide the net income ratably among 
their creditors, a nd to pay any residue to the debtors, 
the majority of the creditors beingauthorized to make 
rules for conducting the business or to put an end to 
~----
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it altogether. The House of Lords held that the 
creditors were not liable as partners for debts in­
curred by the trustees in carrying on the business 
under the assignment. The decision was put upon the 
g round that the liability of one partner for the acts 
of his copart21er is i n truth the liaLJility of a principle 
for t he acts of his agent; that a right to participate 
in the profits, though cogent is not conclusive evidence 
t}i...at the busine ss is carr ied on or in part .-I:'or the pe-c'son 
receiving them, and that the test of his ability as a 
partner is whether h e has authorized the managers of a 
business to carry it on in his behalf. The creditors in 
this case proved that the bus iuess was only being run 
until such time as the business affairs could be wound 
up, and the managers only had ~) ower to carryon the 
business to such ends. Th : creditors were not held to 
be partners i n t he firm. 
Possibly the leading case in opposition to the net 
profit test is the case of Eastman vs. Clark, 53 N. H.276. 
This case holds that Vtfaugher vs. Carver is based on a 
false asstLllption, namely, that a man who takes part of 
the profits, tak es part of that fund on which the creditor 
of the trader relies for his payment. The fallacy lies 
in that creditors cannot, nor do rely on net profit for 
pa;VTflent. Net profits do not exist until creditors are 
paid. The fact that net profits are realized, presupposes 
that the creditors of the firm are satisfied, or that the 
partnership assets are sufficient to satisfy their claims. 
------- - - --- -
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A sound argument in favor of th~ net profit test 
is that if one stipulates for an interest i n t h e profits 
of a business which would g ive him a specific lien or 
a ' :preference in payment over other creditors, giving him 
the full benefit of the increased profits without any 
cOl 'responding risk in case of l oss , it would operate un­
justly as to other creditors. This is disposed of by 
]Vlr . Story as follows: "The creditors to whom he is 
preferred are only .the separate creditors of the actual 
partner; he has ~o preference over t he creditors, for 
there are no profits until they are paid, and it is only 
out Oj~ t h e profit s that his remuneration is to come. 
And though a partner is entitled to an account, yet a 
person may b e entitled to an account and still not 
be a partner. If he is to share a sum equal to a share 
of the profits, by the great weight of' authori t y , clearly 
n o partner, yet how can he secure t h e payment of the 
compens ation agreed upon unless h e ha s an account? 
A third argument is t hat t h e sharer of the net profits 
will otherwi s e receive usurious interest without risk . 
But usury is punishable by law, and it is not customary 
to punish usury by compelling parties to perform contracts 
whi ch they never made, 
A fourth arg;ument is t hat the net profit rule is 
necess ary to protect third per sons against the frauds 
which mi ght be practiced if secret agreements were allowed 
to be binding on third persons . It is conceded by 
------ --
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the supporters of this doctrine that so far as this agree ­
ment is known it is to be binding on all who have knowledge 
of it. It is also conceded by the opposition as in the 
case of' Eastman vs. Clark, that although it is nearly 
impossible for one to 5ain access to the net profits, that 
if perchance h e should obtain a part of the gross returns, 
he must of course refund them if needed to pay debts; for 
his own a g reement does not authorize hiIll to receive any 
dividend until all the debts are paid. 
The argument that one who shares in the profits might 
not bear his burden of t he losses as a rallacy. If he has 
paid nothing for his right , there is no consideration, and 
the r'e fore we must presume that he :pays something, and does 
bear a burden in that he runs t he risk of losing what 
he puts in. His claim is not enforceable until all the 
creditors of the firm are satisfied. Also, it is held 
that an agreement to share profits without being liable for 
its debts is not in its nature against the policy of the law. 
It seems to follow t hat though the profit sharing test 
is eviden ce of a partnership, it is only that and nothipg 
more. 
The second test or the test of intention,seems to be 
much more controlling than the former. 'This was follo wed 
i n both Beecher vs . Bush and Eastman vs. Clark. The conclu­
sion in Beecher vs. Bush W8.S that the test 01' partnership 
mus t be found i n the intent of t he partie s the'mselve s. They 
may say they intend mane when their contract plainly shows 
t h e contrary and in that case the intent shall control the 
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contradictory statement. In this case, there was no 
agen cy of eith er to a ct for t h e other or for bot n , no 
participation of profits, no sharing of l ~ sses, and no 
corrunon property. They intended no partnership, and the re 
can be n o such t h 1ng as a partnersh 1p as to th1rd persons 
wh en a s betV'feen t h e p arties t he :mselves there is no partner­
ship, a nd t h e third persons h ave not been m1sle d by con­
ceaLnent of facts or by deceptive appe ar ance s. 
The case of Yatsuyana j i v s. Shimam:n1s, 5 9 Wash 24 h eld 
that: !f The essential test in determining the existence 
of a part -ne rship is whether the l=B- rti e s 1ntended to estab­
lisri such a relation, and as betwe en themselves t h e 1nten­
tioD must be determined by t heir express a greemen t or 
1nferred f rom t h eir acts ~ Pa rticipation 1n the pro f its of 
a busine ss 1s a mere circumstance to show the relation 
between persons tak ing the profits an d those carrying on 
the business, t h e test of partnership between t h e pa rt1es 
being a que s tion of' actual intent, either expre s sed in 
t h e contract or imp l i ed from the acts of the p arties and 
the circumstances surrounding their relationship . (Roach 
vs. Rector. 9 3 Ark. 521. 
Where there is no proof of actual agreement, the rule 
of sharing profits raising a presumption of partnership 
is applicable. But where there is such an a greement, the 
question of partnership mus t be det e r rl1ined from it. The 
court will look to the entire transaction in order to find 
t h e intention of the parties, and this intention when 
discovered will determine the ex istence or non-existence of 
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the alleged partnership. (In re Hirth 189 Fed. 926.) 
The third test, the test of sharing losses, is 
always coup led. with t he sharing of profits. It is the 
presumption that where Oile shares profits he will also 
share losses, but this is not conclusive. As has been 
formerly stated, one may share profits without losses, 
but when the two are done toge ther, it is strong evidence 
of a partnership. 
It has been sometimes held that the sharing of gross 
returns mak es the p articipants partners, and seems more 
feasable than the net profit te st, in that if in the 
latter case, the one who shares in t he net profits, takes 
from t he creditors part of the fund on which they rely . 
for payment, much more does he who shar es in gross returns. 
But the rule is and has been tha t an a greement to share 
gross returns, does not create a p a r tnership. The Uniform 
Partnership Act provides; liThe receip t of gross returm 
does not of itself establish a partnership, whether or not 
t h e persons s h aring theri1 have a joint or corrnnon right or 
any interest in the property from which the profits are 
derived. 1/ 
The next and probably most impcbrtant test is the 
mutual a gency te s t. The for::'B.ation of a partnership makes 
the me::nbers thereof mutual a gents in the conduct of the 
:partnershl:9 business, and in many cases this mutual agency 
is r~de the test to determine the existen ce of a partnership. 
Cox vs. h ickman seems to hold that one should not be 
held liable as a dormant or sleeping partner where the trade 
------ --- - -- -
- - -- -- ------
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might not be fairly sai d to have been caI'rie d on for him, 
and when, therefore, he 'would stand in the relation of 
principal toward the ostensible members of the firm as his 
agent s, Lord Wensleydale says, II A man who allows another to 
carryon trade, whether in his own na.'11e or not to buy and 
sell, and to pay over all the profits to him, is undoubtedly 
the principal, ancl the person 3;0 employed is his agent, and 
the principal is lis. ble for the agent's contracts in the course 
of his employment. So if two or more agree that they should , 
carryon a trade, and share the profits of it, each is a 
principal, and e a ch is a n ,agent for the other, and each is 
bound by the other's contract in carrying on the trade, 
as much as a single principal would be by the act of an 
agent who is to give all of the profits to the Employer. II 
Therefore, on principle the true test of a partnership at 
last, is left to be that of the relation of the parties as 
principal a nd agent. (Harvey vs . Childs', 22 Am. Rep 387.) 
,but even though mutual agency may be a useful test in 
many instances, .it is not strictly log ical nor entirely 
satisfactory, and it has been pointed out tha t the agency 
results from the partnership and not the partnership from 
the agency . In other words, agency is one of the atflributes 
of a partnership. 
It makes no difference what arrangements have been l'nade 
between the r:arties for conducting their business, for as 
between themselves, if no partnership were intended, then 
there is none as between themselves . So it is held that 
whether a party who furnishes money to another under an 
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agreement where he shall receive instead of interest, 
half the profits of the business whi ch the other con­
ducts, as a r:a rtner in the business or whether he 
merely loaned the money depends on the intention of the 
parties. (Wi lloughby vs. Hildredth, 182 Mo. App. 80.) 
That intention does not necessarily refer to the conscious 
working of the mind, butto the legal intention which the 
law deduces from the acts of the parties, and, if they 
intend to do a thing which in law constitutes a partner ­
ship, they are partners though their purpose was to avoid 
the creation of such a relation. (Breinig vs. Sparrow, 
39 Ind. App . 455.) 
All the facts surrounding the transaction must be 
tak en into considerat ion. Among these facts is whether or 
not the alleged partner acquired by the contract any 
property in or control over, or specific lien to the 
profits before their division, in preference to other 
creditors. The intent of a partnership relation in respect 
to partnership liability to thi ~u persons is determined by 
the contract as a whole considered together with the conduct 
of the parties to the contract and dealings 8.S to the world. 
(Westcott vs. Gilman, 150 Pac. 777.) 
Still ru10ther test of intention seems to ue the common 
ownership of property. But it has been held in the cases 
of Butler Savings Bank vs. Osborne, 159 Pa. 10, and Noyes vs. 
Cusrmlan, 25 vt. 320 , that tenants in common engaged in the 
development or improvement of the connnon property will be 
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presUY.~ed in the absence of proof of a contract of partner­
ship, to hold the same relation to each other during such 
improvement or development as before it began. As to third 
persons, they may subject themselve s to liability as part­
ners by a course of dealing, or by their acts and deduc ­
t 
tions, but as to each other their relation depends on their 
title, until by an agree'iJent with each other they change it. 
'1'he English rule which the American Courts have followed 
is that when tenants in common agree to carryon mining 
operations upon their land each contributing to the expenses 
in proportion to his respective interest in the land, they 
will be considered, both to themselves and third person.s as 
the ordinary owners of land, working their respective shares, 
subjec t to no lmvs of partnership whatever. 
A mere community of interest in real or personal est8te 
does not constitute a partnership. But where a purchase of 
that c haracter is made, and the premises are rebuilt or 
repaired for the p urpose of prosecuting some joint enterprise 
or adventure, and under an agreement to share in the profits 
and losses of the undel"taking, the contract then becomes one 
constituting alpartnership, and each member is liable thereof 
as a partner, and they are liable jointly for services per ­
formed in perfectine; their j oint undertaking. (N'oyes vs. 
Cuslxman, 25 vt. 390.) 
Swmning up the various and conflicting decisions upon 
the test of partnership, _l.t is safe to say that insofl:n~ as 
any actual partnership is concerned, intention is the usual 
test, that is, as between the partners themselves. As regards 
------- --
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partnership liability to thind persons, there is a 
considerable diverstty of opinion. The test usually 
applied is the sharing of profits and losses together 
with the mutual a gency doctrine. There is, however, a 
tendency of the American courts to look to the so-called 
tests more as presumptive than conclusive tests, and to 
take all the matter of the transaction into c onsideration 
in arriving at a decision. 
4: Joint Enterprise or Business. 
a. Distinguished from partnership. 
It is not nec essar y that there shoul c1 be a s e ries of 
transaction s nor that the relation ship between t he parties 
should continue a long time to con stitute a partnership. It 
~ay exist for a single venture or undertaking . (Jones vs. 
Davies, 72 Am. St. Rep. 354.) This was a case where three 
persons joiEed together and l-JUl~chased land for the .purpose 
of sale and profit only. The propert~ w~s prirchased in 
the narae of one of the par ties. It was held that it is im­
mat erial in whose name the purchase is made, or the title 
tak e n , as in such case the property is to be deemed to be 
IB- rtne r ship proDerty , and the par ties are entitled t o the 
rights and subject to the liabilities of partners. An 
added fact in th case vras that the parties were engaged in 
this single transaction only, and it was held that a 
partner'ship might exist for a single .venture, or single 
venture, or sing le transaction such as the purchase of 
land for speculation. 
A transaction such as the latter is sometimes termed 
a jOint adventure, and althoug4 it is also k nowl1 as a 
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partnership, still there is a difference in the meaning 
of the terms. A partnership is formed for transacting 
a general business of some ki nd, while a joint adventure 
is formed for a single transaction. 
5: Partnership by estoppel. 
It seems unnecessary to speak of estoppel 8.S a test of 
partnership, as the very meaning of the word raised the 
implication that the acts of the party estopped, prevent 
him from setting up the real facts of no such relation. It is 
based unon the principle that if a person holds himself out 
either actively or passib1y, or permits himself to be held out 
as a member of a partnership, and so, perhaps, induces third 
parties to deal with the firm and extend credit upon the 
belief' that the party estopped was a member thereof, and 
upon the credit of this party, when otherwise they would not 
have so dealt, he should not t hen be allowed to·deny his 
apparent connection with the partnership and to escape the 
liability to the detriment of the creditors who relied upon 
his acts or representations. (Morris VB. Brosn, 177 Ala. 389.)· 
lJVhen 8. holding out as partners has once been established, 
the parties are liable to one induced thereby to give credit. 
The ground of such liability is not upon the direct rep­
resentations betwe en the parties, to prevent fraud. The 
onl:)r means b y "'ihlcn pers ons between "whom there is no 
actual partnership can b e held liable as partners is by 
making out a case of estoppel against them, and all the 
elements of estoppel must be proved . 
- -----------
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In order to hodl one a me:mber of a partnership by 
estoppe l, it must appear that the person dealing with the 
firm believed, and had a reason~ iJle ri[ ht to believe, that 
the party he seeks to hold as a partner 'was a member of 
the firm, and that credit was to some extent induced by 
this belief, and it must also appear that the holding out 
W 8. S by the party sought to be charged, or by his authority 
or with his knowled;;e or assent . This where it is not 
the direct act of the party, may be inferrea from tne cir­
cumstances, such as fro!!l advertisements, shop-bills, signs, 
or cards, or from various oth er acts, from which it is 
reasonably inferred that the holding out was with his 
authority, knowled '; e or assent, and whether a party has 
so held himself out is i n every case a question of fact 
and not of law. 
It vms also held that a ' jury may infer that a person 
was held out to the public as partner with knowledge and 
consent from the fact that he knew that his name was 
signed with that of dher persons to an advert isement 
calling attention to their business and soliciting f rom 
t h e public a continuance of confidence and business, and 
did {,ot insert in a newspaper in which such advertisernents 
were published any denial of the partnership, and evidence 
of this fact is a&aissable though the party dealing with 
the SUP:90sed firm never' saw the advertisements, where it 
has been shown that h e had trusted the firm in good faith 
and upon g ood grounds . (FletcherPullen. 1 4 Am.. St . Rep.355.) 
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6: Existence of a Partnership. 
a. Nature of Question . 
b. Burden of Proof. 
After enu:.rnerating the vEl.rious elements and tests of 
a partnership, we have arrived at the final analysis, 
namely, the burden of proof under certain conditions and 
relations. 
Generally speaking, the burden of proving a partner­
ship a par tnership is on the plaintiff. The law never 
presumes the existe::lce of a partnership, but requires 
those v/ho assert its existen ce, especially as between 
themselves, to prove such e x ist ence by the clearest and 
most positive evidence. (Chapin vs . Cherry. 147 S.W.I084.) 
\i1Jhere a plaintiff declared against a defendant individually 
but sought to charge hiIn as a partner, the burden was 
held to be on the plaintiff to show the partnership, but 
is is held that vvh en the evidence prima facie establishes 
a partnership, or when it is such that a partnership may 
reasonably be in~erred, the burden is cast upon the 
defendant to show an incorporation where it was sou.ght 
to avoid individual liability, on the ground that the 
comp-any was incorporated. (Henshaw vs. Root, 60 Inc.220.) 
W]j.ere the action is between partners as for accounting 
or dissolution, the burden is on the plain~irf to prove 
the existence of a partnership . 
Courts recognize the fact that no absolute rule can 
be given either as to th e amount or kind of proof suffi c ient 
to establish the relation of partnership among the persons 
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sought to be charged. It is apparent that the proof 
must be sufficient to bring the parties within the 
comprehension of the definitions previ ously given . 
That is, the evic.ence must be sufficient to show some 
arrangement or agreement between the persons sought to 
be charged as partners, to contribute money, goods, skill 
or labor to some business or enterprise, to the end that 
the profits der'ived therefrom may be divided between them; 
or generally an 8.greement to the effect that they sll.are in 
the profits and losses . It has also been shown sufi'iciellt 
in r espect to third parties, to prove that O·'le of the 
persons sought to be charged, shall have permitted the 
others to use his creditor to hold him out as jointly 
liable with themselves . 
To establish the fact of partnership between them­
selves much stricter proof is necemary than in cases 
be t ween partners and third persons. The reason for this 
is that it is within the powers of the partners to give 
evidence on the subject of the partnership than a third 
person could ordinarily produce. (Walker vs. !Viathews, 
58 Ill. 196.) 
The question as to what constitutes a partnership is 
one of law, but whether or not one exists is a question 
of fact to be determined by the evidence surrounding the 
case . 
